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“I know my conduct is dangerous to others, but 
I don’t care if someone is hurt or killed.”1
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 On a fairly regular basis, prosecutors are faced with filing decisions with respect to fatal 
traffic collisions.  Many of them, of course, do not involve criminal negligence and are not 
prosecuted as crimes.  Sometimes, on the other hand, the circumstances are egregious and the 
decision to be made is whether to file a case as a vehicular manslaughter2 or as a murder,3 on an 
implied malice theory.4 There are a finite number of California Supreme Court and Court of 
Appeal cases (beginning with People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290) that have addressed the 
sufficiency of evidence for implied-malice murder in vehicular collision cases - and they are 
each dependent on an analysis of the facts involved.   
 This article attempts to distill from recent case law the factors the California Supreme 
Court5 and the Court of Appeal have highlighted as pivotal in determining whether to file a case 
as a vehicular manslaughter or as a murder, in order to give prosecutors a paradigm from which 
to operate.  
 The first section explains that upon facts showing wantonness and a conscious disregard 
for human life a conviction for second degree murder is appropriate.6 The second section 
highlights the significant factors the courts have used to aid in order to give prosecutors a better 
understanding of the context in which this charge is appropriate.  Finally, the last section sets 
forth a compendium of cases, from which the facts commonly relied on can be derived.  The 
 
1 People v. Olivas (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 984, 988. 
2 Cal. Penal Code Section 192(c). 
3 Cal. Penal Code Sections 187-189.  Murder of the second degree is [also] the unlawful killing of a human 
being when: (1) The killing resulted from an intentional act, (2) The natural consequences of the act are 
dangerous to human life, and (3) The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with 
conscious disregard for, human life.   When the killing is the direct result of such an act, it is not necessary to 
prove that the defendant intended that the act would result in the death of a human being. See Judicial Council 
of California Criminal Jury Instructions (“CALCRIM”) No. 520; See also California Jury Instructions, Criminal, 
7th Ed. (“CALJIC”) No. 8.31. 
4 “Such malice may be express or implied.  It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to 
take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or when the 
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.  When it is shown that the killing 
resulted from the intentional doing of an act with express or implied malice as defined above, no other mental state 
need be shown to establish the mental state of malice aforethought. Neither an awareness of the obligation to act 
within the general body of laws regulating society nor acting despite such awareness is included within the 
definition of malice.”  Cal. Penal Code Section 188. 
Implied malice contemplates a subjective awareness of a higher degree of risk than does gross negligence, and 
involves an element of wantonness which is absent in gross negligence.  People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 
296. 
5 All references are to the California Supreme Court unless otherwise indicated.  
6 California Penal Code Section 192(c). 
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article concludes with a summary of factors prosecutors should look for when such a 
determination is essential to their filing decision.  
 
II.  A KILLING RESULTING FROM THE USE OF AN AUTOMOBILE MAY 
CONSTITUTE EITHER SECOND DEGREE MURDER OR VEHICLUAR 
MANSLAUGHTER DEPENDING ON THE UNDERLYING FACTS AND 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
The court in People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, first discussed the 
distinction between murder and manslaughter.  “Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being 
… with malice aforethought.”7 Malice is implied “when circumstances attending the killing 
show an abandoned and malignant heart.”8 Manslaughter by contrast is the unlawful killing of a 
human being without malice.9 The required level of culpability for either gross vehicular 
manslaughter while intoxicated10 or vehicular manslaughter11 is gross negligence.12 Both 
statutes expressly provide they “shall not be construed as prohibiting or precluding a charge of 
murder under Section 188 upon facts exhibiting wantonness and a conscious disregard for life to 
support a finding of implied malice, or upon facts showing malice, consistent with the holding of 
the California Supreme Court in People v. Watson [(1981)] 30 Cal.3d 290.”13 
The court in Contreras then explained that the court in Watson distinguished gross 
negligence from implied malice in a drunk driving case.  Gross negligence was defined as the 
exercise of so slight a degree of care as to raise a presumption of a conscious indifference to the 
consequences.14 Implied malice requires proof the accused acted deliberately with conscious 
disregard for life.15 
Implied malice contemplates a subjective awareness of a higher degree of risk than does 
gross negligence, and involves an element of wantonness which is absent in gross 
negligence. [Citations.] [¶] … A finding of gross negligence is made by applying an 
objective test: if a reasonable person in defendant's position would have been aware of 
the risk involved, then defendant is presumed to have had such an awareness.  [Citation.]  
However, a finding of implied malice depends upon a determination that the defendant 
actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard. [Citation].16 
7 Cal. Penal Code Section 187(a).  
8 Cal. Penal Code Section 188. 
9 Cal. Penal Code Sections 191.5(a), 192.   
10 Cal. Penal Code Section 191.5.  
11 Cal. Penal Code Section 192(c). 
12 People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1204; People v. Bennett (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1032, 1036.  
13 See bench notes, California Penal Code Section 192(c). 
14 Watson at p. 297; See People v. Costa (1953) 40 Cal.2d 160, 166. 
15 Watson at p. 297.   
16 Watson at p. 296-97; Cal. Penal Code Section 188; see Kastel v. Stieber (1932) 215 Cal. 37, 46. 
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It is the “conscious disregard for human life” that sets implied malice apart from gross 
negligence.17 
Even if the act results in a death that is accidental, as defendant contends was the case 
here, the circumstances surrounding the act may evince implied malice.  [Citations.]  
Considerations such as whether the act underlying the homicide is a felony, a 
misdemeanor or inherently dangerous in the abstract, are not dispositive in assessing 
whether a defendant acted with implied malice.  [Citations.]  A finding of implied malice 
must be based upon ‘consideration of the circumstances preceding the fatal act. 
[Citations.]’18 
Thus, the court in Contreras reasoned that the absence of intoxication or high-speed 
flight from pursuing officers does not preclude a finding of malice.  “These facts merely are 
circumstances to be considered in evaluating culpability.  Where other evidence shows ‘a wanton 
disregard for life, and the facts demonstrate a subjective awareness of the risk created, malice 
may be implied.19 In such cases, a murder charge is appropriate.’ [Citations.].”20 
IV. APPLICATION TO PROSECUTORIAL PRACTICE: THE FACTORS  
 
In People v. Olivias (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 984, the court rejected the claim that a 
conviction of vehicular second degree murder requires proof of all the factors identified in 
Watson. The court stated that the distinction between that crime and the vehicular manslaughter 
is admittedly subtle, but there is no formula to go by; rather, case-by-case analysis of the facts is 
required.21 In other words, the court in Olivas held that the evidence adduced in Watson,
although sufficient to support the charge, was not necessary.22 Below is a list of the most 
common factors used by the California Supreme Court and California Court of Appeals in 
vehicular killing situations, it should be noted that each conviction for murder relied upon a 
combination of these factors23 rather than one:   
 
17 People v. Nieto Benitez  (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 109; People v. Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1221-1222; People 
v. Protopappas  (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 152, 162-164.  
18 People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 954-955. 
19 Cal. Penal Code Section 188. 
20 People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 955. 
21 People v. Olivas (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 984, 988-989.  “The court explicitly rejected the claim that stated, 
‘nowhere does the opinion in Watson state that all of the factors present in that case are necessary to a finding of 
second degree murder … Watson … deliberately declin[ed] to prescribe a formula for an analysis of vehicular 
homicide cases…’” People v. McCarnes (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 525, 535. 
22 People v. Olivias (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 984, 988. 
23 Albright, Contreras, Ortiz relied on three factors; Jarmon, McCarnes, Olivas, Watson, Whitson relied on four 
factors; Sanchez relied on five factors; Autry and Murray relied on six factors; David relied on seven factors. 
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1) Illegal Driving Maneuvers:  Running red lights & stop signs
In David, Olivas, Watson and Whitson the court considered the fact that the defendant 
was observed running through a red light,24 red lights,25 or stop signs.26 In Watson, the defendant 
drove through a red light, narrowly avoiding a collision.27 In David, the court emphasized the 
fact that the defendant was forced to stop only because when he drove through an intersection 
where his signal was red, that he then “struck the victim’s vehicle with explosive force, killing 
both occupants.”28 This situation is similar to Whitson, where the defendant ran through a red 
light at a speed estimated to be 77 miles per hour and collided with another car, killing two 
women.29 Horrifically, the defendant in Olivas, was observed by the officers chasing him, 
running four stop signs and three red lights.30 
In the most recent of these cases, the California Supreme Court in David held that “in 
addition to the foregoing express admission by defendant of his awareness of the danger to life 
posed by his driving, the evidence before the jury concerning the circumstances leading up to the 
collision strongly supports a finding of such awareness.” 31 Therefore, if the defendant ran stop 
signs or red lights prior to the killing or engaged in risky lane changes or passing, that 
information is a contributing factor to aid the People in establishing a second degree murder 
charge.   
2) Speeding
Speeding is the most commonly seen factor among the vehicular murder cases.  
California courts have considered speeding a factor anywhere from a finding of excess speed of 
5 miles per hour to 70 miles per hour over the posted limit.  In Albright, the defendant pressed 
his accelerator to the floor of his station wagon reaching speeds of 90-110 miles per hour in a 
residential area.32 In Autry, Murray and Ortiz, the defendants were traveling on a freeway and at 
some point before the fatal collision reached speeds of up to 80 miles per hour.33 In Contreras,
David, Olivas, Watson, Whitson the defendant’s speed nearly doubled the posted speeds.34 
24 People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290. 
25 People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1111; People v. Olivas (1985) Cal.App.3d 984, 986. 
26 People v. Olivas (1985) Cal.App.3d 984, 986. 
27 People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 293. 
28 People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1112; see also People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 233.. 
29 People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 233. 
30 People v. Olivas (1985) Cal.App.3d 984, 986. 
31 People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 251 [emphasis added]. 
32 People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 884. 
33 See Autry at p. 356, Murray at p. 738 and Ortiz at p. 107.  
34 Contreras - 55-60 m.p.h. in 25 m.p.h. zone, David - 60-80 m.p.h. in a 20 m.p.h. zone, Olivas - 50-100 m.p.h. in a 
25-30 m.p.h. zone, Watson - 84 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone, and in Whitson the defendant traveled 80-85 m.p.h. in a 
residential area.   
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The California Supreme Court in Watson said that second degree murder based on 
implied malice has been committed when a person does “an act, the natural consequences of 
which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that 
his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.”35 
Phrased in a different way, “malice may be implied when defendant does an act with a high 
probability that it will result in death and does it with a base antisocial motive and with a wanton 
disregard for human life.”36 The Watson Court believed that there existed a rational ground for 
concluding that defendant’s conduct was sufficiently wanton to hold him on a second degree 
murder charge.  In reaching this conclusion, the court considered: 
Defendant drove at highly excessive speeds through city streets, an act presenting a great 
risk of harm or death … Defendant nearly collided with a vehicle after running a red 
light; he avoided the accident only by skidding to a stop.  He thereafter resumed his 
excessive speed before colliding with the victims' car, and then belatedly again attempted 
to brake his car before the collision (as evidenced by the extensive skid marks before and 
after impact) suggesting an actual awareness of the great risk of harm which he had 
created.37 
In combination, these facts reasonably and readily support the conclusion that the 
defendant actually appreciated the risk involved and nonetheless acted wantonly and with a 
conscious disregard for human life.   
 
3) Not Necessarily Illegal Driving Maneuvers:  Swerving & Passing
In Autry, David, Murray, and Ortiz each of the defendants were observed swerving into 
another lane,38 over the median,39 or into oncoming traffic before their fatal collisions.40 In 
Autry, the defendant “recklessly drove on a freeway, swerved into the median strip, struck and 
killed two highway construction workers, and injured his two passengers.”41 In David, the 
defendant was observed passing slower southbound traffic by swerving over the double-double 
yellow center lanes forcing northbound traffic out of its lanes.42 In Murray, the defendant 
traveled against traffic about four miles primarily in the emergency lane next to the center 
divider and the number one (fast) lane.43 In Ortiz, the defendant tried to overtake a vehicle 
 
35 People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 719, quoting from People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574, 587.) 
36 Watson at p. 300. 
37 Watson at p. 300. 
38 People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1111. 
39 People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 355. 
40 People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 737; People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 107. 
41 People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 355 [emphasis added]. 
42 People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1111 [emphasis added]. 
43 People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 737. 
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traveling in front of him by crossing a double yellow line on a state highway.44 Unfortunately, 
the defendant found himself driving directly in the path of an oncoming vehicle on the other side 
of the highway, causing his car to collide with the oncoming car, killing two occupants.45 
The California Court of Appeal in Murray stated that the pattern of defendant’s driving, 
that he was going the wrong way on the freeway, indicates that he had to be aware of the danger 
posed to human lives, and knowing this, he deliberately proceeded in conscious disregard of that 
risk.46 
In Albright, court added to its finding of implied malice when the defendant passed three 
cars before his fatal collision.47 Here, even though the defendant merely passed three cars, the 
court reasoned that this showed he “knew other people were on the road.”48 In McCarnes, the 
defendant repeatedly engaged in extremely dangerous passing maneuvers at speeds close to “65 
plus” miles an hour on a two-lane road and that eventually lead to the head-on collision killing 
four.49 The court decided when the defendant operated a motor vehicle in conscious disregard 
for the safety of others, implied malice could be found sufficient to convict the defendant of 
second degree murder.50 It is shown throughout these cases that the court has considered 
swerving and passing as another contributing factor to aid in establishing a second degree murder 
charge because it shows that the drivers were aware of other drivers when making their driving 
decisions. 
 
4) “Almost” collisions on the day of the killing
In Murray, Olivas and Watson, each defendant struck another car before their fatal 
collisions.  In Murray, the defendant first struck the side of one car, and caused another to 
swerve out of control; two persons were injured when he did so;51 and then the defendant struck 
another car head-on, killing all four persons inside.52 This court considered evidence of 
defendant’s reckless driving up to 24 miles away from the point of collision.53 
44 People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 107. 
45 People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 106. 
46 People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 747. 
47 People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 884-885. 
48 People v. Albright, (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 887. 
49 People v. McCarnes (1986) Cal.App.3d 525, 528. 
50 People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 887. 
51 People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 737. 
52 People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 737. 
53 People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 741, n.2 [emphasis added]. 
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This consideration is significant because the courts tend use this factor to show a 
conscious awareness of one’s dangerous driving before the actual fatality.  The Court of 
Appeal in People v. Eagles54 explains this concept well:   
Evidence of excessive speed resulting in a near collision is relevant to knowledge of risk, 
‘an actual awareness of the great risk of harm’ of excessive speed … We agree with the 
prosecutor at trial that it is a permissible inference that ‘[when] you’re driving around . . . 
at a high rate of speed, almost cause an accident, you must see what the risk of harm is 
that can follow it.’  What defendant knew in the afternoon he undoubtedly knew that 
night before the fatal accident.  The evidence was admissible to prove implied malice.55 
5) Alcohol consumption
Alcohol consumption almost as frequent a factor as speeding is in the vehicular murder 
cases.  It is no surprise “[t]he drunk driver cuts a wide swath of death, pain, grief, and untold 
physical and emotional injury across the roads of California and the nation.”56 That being said, 
California’s legal blood alcohol content is .08 percent and drunk driving is a significant factor 
considered when whether or not the killing is a murder or manslaughter.  In the vehicular murder 
cases, defendants have had a blood alcohol content ranging from .17 percent57 to .27 percent.58 
In Watson the Supreme Court held, citing Taylor v. Superior Court that “‘One who wil[l]fully 
consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must 
operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with 
a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious 
disregard of the safety of others.’”59 
54 People v. Eagles (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 330 [vehicular murder prosecution that did not involve the use of alcohol 
or other toxicants]. 
55 People v. Eagles (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 330, 340; See also People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 301. 
56 Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 898-899.   
57 See Albright, Sanchez; see also Murray [defendant’s blood alcohol content was .18-.23 percent].   
58 People v. McCarnes (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 525; see also Autry [defendant’s blood alcohol content was .22 
percent];  
see also Watson [defendant’s blood alcohol content was .23 percent].   
59 People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 300-301.  Cf. People v. Castorena (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 558 [where 
defendant was convicted of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated and not second degree murder.  In this 
case, the defendant and several of his coworkers consumed four to five pitchers of beer over a period of several 
hours, defendant then drove to a friend’s house, where he drank four glasses of brandy.  Deciding to go home, 
defendant tried to exit the house through a window, apparently mistaking it for the front door. His friend, concerned 
about defendant’s level of intoxication, asked for his car keys and told defendant he should not drive and offered to 
give him a ride.  Defendant agreed initially and gave his keys his friend, and walked to the friend’s car. However, 
defendant returned to the house, explaining he needed to drive his sister-in-law to work early the next morning.  
After his friend returned his keys, the defendant left the house, only to return within a few minutes.  He again 
changed his mind, took his keys and drove away.  “Traveling 70 to 100 miles per hour, often on the wrong side of 
the road,” the defendant “ran several red lights.”  Ultimately he rear-ended a car, injuring the driver and killing a 
passenger.  People v. Castorena (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 558, 559.] 
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This factor shows both knowledge and conscious disregard that his driving while 
intoxicated endangers the lives of others.  Contreras court noted “the criminal act underlying 
vehicular murder is not the use of intoxicating substances in anticipation of driving but is driving 
under the influence with a conscious disregard for life.  The former is not necessarily a finding of 
the latter”60 Additionally, the court stated, “the absence of intoxication or high speed flight from 
pursuing officers does not preclude a finding of malice.”61 
6) Drug use
Interestingly, the three California vehicular murder cases, the drug of choice is 
Phencyclidine (commonly referred to as “PCP”).   In David, the defendant drove while under the 
influence of PCP and collided with another vehicle on a Thanksgiving evening, killing its two 
occupants.62 The court found implied malice necessary to uphold a second degree murder 
conviction63 and based its finding on substantial evidence that supported defendant drove his 
vehicle again64 knowing he was under the influence of PCP.65 It was held, in light of his prior 
experience with PCP, he must have realized he was under the influence.66 The court also noted 
“there is ample evidence … to support the conclusion appellant knew while he was driving that 
his conduct was dangerous to life and consciously disregarded that risk.”67 
In Jarmon, the court found the defendant deliberately ingested drugs, thereby including 
his impaired state, with complete disregard to safety of others.68 The trial judge found that he 
elected “to do drugs anyway and disregard the distinct possibility … [he] might kill somebody” 
despite knowing “that drugs can produce bizarre effects which can cause conduct which is 
dangerous to others.”69 
In Olivas, the Court of Appeal noted the defendant had consumed enough PCP to impair 
his physical and mental facilities, and then drove at extremely high speed through city streets for 
a relatively lengthy period of time, creating a great risk to other drivers.70 The fact he was aware 
 
60 People v. Olivas (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 985; see People v. David (1994) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109 [because of 
the defendant’s prior experience with PCP, the court rejected his argument that he lacked implied malice because no 
evidence existed that he planned to drive when he consumed a PCP cigarette].   
61 People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 955. 
62 People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1111. 
63 People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1115. 
64 The defendant had two prior vehicle collisions resulting from driving under the influence of PCP, resulting in two 
criminal convictions. 
65 People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1114. 
66 People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1114-1115. 
67 People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1114-1115. 
68 People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1351. 
69 People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1351. 
70 People v. Olivas (1985) Cal.App.3d 984, 989. 
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of this risk, was shown by his collision with one car, his near collision with two other cars, and 
his deliberate avoidance of two pursuing police cars.71 
In combination, the use of drugs coupled with other factors is additional support to 
establish the defendant acted wantonly and with a conscious disregard for human life.   
7) Traffic Citations
In Contreras, the defendant had received nine serious traffic citations in the prior two 
years.72 In McCarnes, the defendant had previously been convicted of reckless driving.73 And, 
the California Supreme Court in Whitson considered the facts the defendant was involved in a 
traffic accident four years prior (for which police determined he was at fault for failing to yield 
the right of way), received a citation for driving at an excessive speed and was cited for failing to 
obey a posted sign two years before.74 
In Ortiz, the court admitted evidence that the defendant had seven past incidents in which 
the defendant had either been convicted of reckless driving, convicted of reckless drunk driving, 
or been observed driving recklessly, and his participation in mandatory educational program 
(known as the SB-38 program) on the dangers of drinking and driving.75 
In ruling that the evidence of the defendant’s prior conduct was admissible, the trial court 
states its rationale: 
‘Every time the defendant drove badly before he allegedly committed these two 
murders,’ the trial judge explained, ‘and every time he was convicted or arrested or 
punished in some fashion, his awareness of the dangers of driving badly increased and 
that is what the district attorney has a legitimate right to try to prove . . . [did] this 
defendant have implied malice in his mind or not when he drove the way he did, and that 
is a subjective standard.  So we have to find out what he was exposed to that most people 
aren’t exposed to in order to understand his level of awareness of the dangers of driving 
badly.76 
It appears that the introduction of “evidence relating to defendant’s poor driving record 
and attendance at traffic school in order to support its claim that, at the time of the collision, 
defendant subjectively was aware of the serious risk of death posed by his reckless driving.” 77 
71 People v. Olivas (1985) Cal.App.3d 984, 989. 
72 People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 947. 
73 People v. McCarnes (1986) Cal.App.3d 525, 528-529. 
74 People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 235. 
75 People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 110. 
76 People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 115-116. 
77 People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 251. 
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8) Driving Under the Influence (DUI) conviction(s)
The cases involving prior DUI convictions are numerous.  The courts have allowed 
evidence of one prior conviction78 up to admitting four prior convictions.  In McCarnes wherein 
the Court of Appeal for the Fourth District, Division Two, held that a defendant’s four prior 
convictions for driving under the influence were admissible to establish implied malice in a 
prosecution for second degree murder arising out of a vehicular homicide.  In so holding, the 
court pointedly observed:  
[The] reason that driving under the influence is unlawful is because it is dangerous, 
and to ignore that basic proposition, particularly in the context of an offense for which 
the punishment for repeat offenders is more severe (Veh. Code, §§ 23165, 23170, 
23175), is to make a mockery of the legal system as well as the deaths of thousands 
each year who are innocent victims of drunken drivers. [para.]  Moreover, included in 
the evidence of two of defendant’s [four] convictions, as shown to the jury, was the 
sentence that he enroll in and complete a drinking driver’s education program.  Even if 
we assume defendant did not realize after his convictions that it was dangerous to 
drink alcohol and drive, surely realization would have eventually arrived from his 
repeated exposure to the driver’s educational program.  To argue otherwise is little 
short of outrageous.79 
In explaining why prior convictions for incidents involving alcohol were admissible 
when the case before it did not involve the use of alcohol, the court in Ortiz further stated:   
 
[T]he requisite mental state at the time of the prior incident -- one supporting a 
subsequent finding of an awareness of the dangers of recklessness -- was not formed 
while inebriated so much as before and after the resulting traffic incident.  Whether 
provoked by alcohol, other intoxicants, or road rage, such incidents typically include a 
host of costly and inconvenient consequences.  From this uncharged misconduct 
evidence, through a series of inferences, a jury could conclude that, at the time of the 
charged misconduct, the defendant possessed a ‘wanton disregard for life, and . . . a 
subjective awareness of the risk created,’ from which ‘malice may be implied . . . .’80 
In explaining why the prior conduct was admissible that the defendant possessed the 
knowledge requisite for second degree murder under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision 
(b), the court stated: 
 
We emphasize the word ‘knowledge’ in the foregoing statutory enumeration because, in 
seeking admission of the uncharged misconduct evidence at defendant’s trial, it was the 
prosecution’s contention that the evidence was relevant because it tended to establish a 
 
78 Autry (4 prior DUI convictions), David (2), Jarmon (1), McCarnes (4), Murray (2), Ortiz (more than 2), Sanchez 
(2).  
79 People v. McCarnes (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 525, 532. 
80 People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 112. 
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subjective awareness on the part of defendant of the disastrous consequences that can 
follow in the wake of recklessly operating a motor vehicle on a public highway.  As 
tending to establish, in other words, defendant’s knowledge--gained in the course of the 
prior misconduct--of the natural consequences, dangerous to life, of the reckless 
operation of a motor vehicle, and of his persistence in that behavior, thus evidencing a 
conscious disregard for the lives of others on the road. These mental features, of course, 
comprise the mens rea of implied malice, thereby supporting an accusation of second 
degree murder.81 
9) Mandatory classes taken related to drinking and driving
In David, the defendant had two prior vehicle collisions resulting from driving under the 
influence of PCP, resulting in two criminal convictions.  As part of his sentence, he also attended 
two educational programs involving the risks of driving while under the influence of alcohol or 
other intoxicants.  The court held in light of his prior experience with PCP and attending 
educational classes, the defendant must have realized he was under the influence and knew while 
driving that this conduct was dangerous to life but consciously disregarded that risk.82 
In Murray the defendant claimed attending mandatory educational classes did not 
necessarily follow that he attained a subjective awareness of the courts material.83 Even though 
the “bulk of these cases involved the use of alcohol or other intoxicants in both the uncharged 
misconduct and the prosecution in which it was sought to be admitted.  The resulting case law 
makes it clear, however, that the contours of the ‘knowledge’ exception to the bar imposed by 
section 1101(a) are not so restricted.”84 The court Autry noted that notwithstanding defendant’s 
failure to attend educational programs, “…the jury could reasonably infer that the convictions 
alone, even without the educational programs, impressed upon appellant the dangers of drunk 
driving.”85 
10) Forewarning before incident cautioning about dangerous driving
In Autry, the defendant’s “probation officer told him he should not drink and drive 
because he might kill someone or be killed, and leave his children without a parent.”86 On the 
day of the fatal accident, defendant was on probation.87 The very morning of the collision, he 
 
81 People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 111-112. 
82 People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1112; Cf. Whitson [where defendant attended traffic school and the 
People successfully used this evidence to support defendant was subjectively aware of the serious risk of death 
posed by his reckless driving].  People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 251. 
83 People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 745. 
84 People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 112. 
85 People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 358; see also People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983. 
86 People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 355. 
87 People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 355. 
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met with his probation officer who warned him not to drink and drive.88 In Jarmon, within a 
two-week period before the collision, the defendant twice admitted to his parole officer that he 
had ingested cocaine and PCP.89 At that time, the parole officer warned him that use of PCP 
carried the “extreme potential for violence” which might cause “injury to himself [and] others 
…”90 Finally, in Sanchez the defendant admitted+ his wife had told him not to drink and drive.91 
The courts have used this factor to establish that “there was sufficient evidence to prove 
defendant’s subjective awareness of the life-threatening consequences of his actions to support a 
finding of implied malice, necessary to support the convictions.”92 
V. SUPPORTING CASE LAW 
 
This section sets forth a compendium of cases, from which the facts commonly relied on 
can be derived.  The cases are listed in alphabetical order.  
1. People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883
On a hot July night defendant drank at least eight beers93 before pressing the accelerator 
to the floor of his station wagon reaching speeds of 90-110 miles per hour.94 The defendant 
passed three cars including smashing “into a 17 year old [boy’s] … car, killing him instantly in a 
fiery explosion.”95 The court noted that none of the various witnesses heard the sound of brakes 
or saw brake lights, nor were there any pre-impact skid marks.96 When the police found the 
defendant, he was sitting next to his car and said, “I have killed someone, I have killed someone, 
it should have been me.”97 The defendant then told the ambulance driver that he had “put the 
pedal to the floor” because he wanted to kill himself, and that was why he was going as fast as he 
could, and that the other car pulled out in front of him.98 “Defendant conceded the recklessness 
 
88 People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 355. 
89 Phencyclidine (commonly referred to as “PCP”).  People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1349. 
90 People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1350. 
91 People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 987. 
92 People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 357. 
93 Defendant’s blood alcohol content was .17 – the People established this significantly slowed his reactions, 
imparted his judgment, balance and coordination, restricted his vision and made him 35 times more likely to have an 
accident than an unintoxicated driver.   
94 People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 884. 
95 People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 884-885. 
96 People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 884-885. 
97 People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 884-885. 
98 People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 885. 
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of his behavior, but argued he was so drunk he could not have harbored malice required to 
establish second degree murder.”99 
The court found that defendant knew other people were on the road and must have known 
of the high probability he would case death if he continued his conduct.100 The Court of Appeals 
found that when defendant had willfully consumed alcohol beverages to the point of intoxication 
and then operated a motor vehicle in conscious disregard for the safety of others, implied malice 
could be found sufficient to convict the defendant of second degree murder.101 
2. People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351
In People v. Autry, the defendant had a blood-alcohol level of .22 percent and “recklessly 
drove on a freeway, swerved into the median strip, struck and killed two highway construction 
workers, and injured his two passengers.”102 Defendant “had four prior convictions for drunk 
driving, suffered in 1983, 1984, and 1991.”103 Interestingly, “he failed to attend court-ordered 
educational programs in connection with those convictions, but in 1991 admitted that he had a 
drinking problem and participated in a 45-day residential alcoholism program at ‘How House,’ 
where participants are ‘bombarded’ with horror stories about the dangers of driving while 
intoxicated.” 104 
In October 1991, his “probation officer told him he should not drink and drive because he 
might kill someone or be killed, and leave his children without a parent.”105 On the day of the 
fatal accident, defendant was on probation.106 That very morning, he met with his probation 
officer who warned him not to drink and drive.107 
Nevertheless, that day appellant drove his Ford Bronco to the desert where he and his 
friends drank beer, bought more beer and drove while drinking two beers.  Defendant, “who by 
then appeared under the influence, lost control, swerved and skidded because he was going too 
fast, about 70 or 80 miles per hour.”108 After “falling asleep and waking up handcuffed to a 
hospital bed and being told he was under arrest for killing two people, appellant said, ‘Fuck ‘em. 
They shouldn’t have been out there in the first place.’”109 
99 People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 885. 
100 People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 887. 
101 People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 887. 
102 People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 355. 
103 People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 355. 
104 People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 355. 
105 People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 355. 
106 People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 355. 
107 People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 355. 
108 People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 356. 
109 People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 356. 
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The Court of Appeals upheld that “there was sufficient evidence to prove defendant’s 
subjective awareness of the life-threatening consequences of his actions to support a finding of 
implied malice, necessary to support the convictions.”110 
3. People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944
In People v. Contreras, the defendant, a “bandit” tow truck driver who had received nine 
serious traffic citations in the prior two years, knew his brakes were defective but still drove 
recklessly at high speed in a residential area, rear-ending a vehicle at a stop sign while racing 
into a accident scene.  On the day of the offense, Contreras was racing another tow truck driver 
side-by-side on a public street at 55-60 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone in an attempt to 
be the first tow truck on the scene of the accident.111 He collided with a car, killing a 13-year-old 
boy inside.112 The court rejected the claim that a murder charge cannot be based on accidental 
homicide that does not involve a high-speed chase or drug-impaired driving and upheld the 
evidence to support a second degree murder conviction on an implied malice theory.113 
In other words, “the absence of intoxication or high speed flight from pursing officers 
does not preclude a finding of malice.  These facts are circumstances to be considered when 
evaluating culpability.”114 In upholding the murder conviction, the court stated “where evidence 
shows “a wanton disregard for life, and the facts demonstrate a subjective awareness of the risk 
created, malice may be implied.  In such cases, a murder charge is appropriate.”115 
4. People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109
The defendant was driving under the influence of PCP116 when he collided with another 
vehicle on a Thanksgiving evening, killing its two occupants.117 The police first observed the 
defendant driving his vehicle 60-80 miles per hour in a residential area where the posted speed 
was 40 miles per hour.118 Then the defendant was observed running through red lights, passing 
slower southbound traffic by swerving over the double-double yellow center lanes forcing 
northbound traffic out of its lanes.119 He was forced to stop because when he drove through an 
intersection where his signal was red, he struck the victim’s vehicle with explosive force, killing 
 
110 People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 357. 
111 People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 947. 
112 People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 952. 
113 People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 953. 
114 People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 955. 
115 People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 955. 
116 Phencyclidine (commonly referred to as “PCP”).  
117 People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1111. 
118 People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1111. 
119 People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1111. 
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both occupants – his vehicle “ricocheting back onto the street, and finally come to rest along the 
center divider.”120 
The defendant had two prior vehicle collisions resulting from driving under the influence 
of PCP, resulting in two criminal convictions.121 As part of his sentence, he also attended two 
educational programs involving the risks of driving while under the influence of alcohol or other 
intoxicants.122 At the time of the fatal Thanksgiving crash, the defendant was in fact, driving 
with a suspended license.   
 The Court of Appeal found there was substantial evidence supporting the finding of 
implied malice and second degree murder.123 The court based its finding on substantial evidence 
that supported defendant drove knowing he was under the influence of PCP.124 In light of his 
prior experience with PCP, the court held that he must have realized he was under the 
influence.125 The court also noted “there is ample evidence … to support the conclusion 
appellant knew while he was driving that his conduct was dangerous to life and consciously 
disregarded that risk.”126 
5. People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345
In People v. Jarmon, the defendant rear-ended a car, killing four people and injuring two 
others while driving under the influence of PCP and alcohol.127 Defendant ran a red stoplight 
and applied his brakes only a split second before the accident.128 One month prior to the killing, 
defendant was released from prison.129 One of the conditions of his parole was to participate in 
antinarcotics testing.130 Within a two week period before the collision, the defendant admitted 
twice admitted to his parole officer that he had ingested cocaine and PCP.131 The parole officer 
warned him that use of PCP carried the “extreme potential for violence” which might cause 
“injury to himself [and] others …”132 The defendant continued to use, sometimes in 
 
120 People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1112. 
121 People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1112. 
122 One for the May 19, 1985 conviction (appellant had a PCP cigarette in his vehicle and was under the influence of 
PCP, he was subsequently convicted of DUI) and the second for his conviction on May 19, 1986 (appellant was 
driving under the influence of PCP and as a result was convicted of a DUI and driving with a suspended license.). 
123 People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1115. 
124 People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1114. 
125 People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1114-1115. 
126 People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1114-1115. 
127 People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1348. 
128 People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1350. 
129 People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1348. 
130 People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1349. 
131 Phencyclidine (commonly referred to as “PCP”).  People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1349. 
132 People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1350. 
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combination: cocaine, marijuana, PCP and alcohol, even after the warning.133 Additionally, the 
defendant had previously been convicted of drunk driving.134 
The Court of Appeal held the evidence supported a finding that defendant deliberately 
ingested drugs, thereby including his impaired state, with complete disregard to safety of 
others.135 “Where circumstances reasonably support the conclusion that a defendant does act 
with a high probability that it will result in death and does it with a base antisocial motive and 
with a wanton disregard for human life.’”136 The court noted the trial judge found that he elected 
“to do drugs anyway and disregard the distinct possibility … [he] might kill somebody” despite 
knowing “that drugs can produce bizarre effects which can cause conduct which is dangerous to 
others.”137 Thus, the court affirmed his convictions for second degree murder.   
6. People v. McCarnes (1986) Cal.App.3d 525
The defendant was convicted of two counts of second degree murder138 on a summer 
Saturday afternoon when he killed two people while driving with a blood alcohol level of .27 
percent.139 The evidence established that the defendant repeatedly engaged in extremely 
dangerous passing maneuvers at speeds close to “65 plus” miles an hour on a two-lane road and 
collided head-on with a VW station wagon.  There were six people in the VW.140 After the 
collision, defendant walked to the vicinity of the VW and a bystander was giving artificial 
respiration to the baby, who was according to the witness missing “a big chunk of her head.” 141 
Defendant then leaned over and said “Don’t die, baby, don’t die,” and walked away.142 When 
the police approached defendant he ran into a field.143 
The defendant had previously been convicted four times for driving under the influence 
of alcohol or alcohol and drugs, and had also previously been convicted of reckless driving.144 
The court found that driving by a person who has a blood alcohol level of .27 percent, and who 
 
133 People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1350. 
134 People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1350. 
135 People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1351. 
136 People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1350. 
137 People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1351. 
138 In addition to two counts of vehicular manslaughter; one count of driving under the influence of alcohol and 
drugs so as to cause bodily injury to another; one count of driving with .10 or more of alcohol in the blood so as to 
cause bodily injury to another; and one count of failing to give the proper information at the scene of the accident. 
139 People v. McCarnes (1986) Cal.App.3d 525, 527-528.  A blood sample taken from defendant about two hours 
later revealed an alcohol level of .23 percent, a criminologist testified that the average burn-off rate was about .02 an 
hour and that that figure was e3quivalent to .27 two hours earlier.  
140 People v. McCarnes (1986) Cal.App.3d 525, 528. 
141 People v. McCarnes (1986) Cal.App.3d 525, 528. 
142 People v. McCarnes (1986) Cal.App.3d 525, 528. 
143 People v. McCarnes (1986) Cal.App.3d 525, 528. 
144 People v. McCarnes (1986) Cal.App.3d 525, 528-529. 
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executes two extremely reckless passing maneuvers and embarks on a third in the face of 
oncoming vehicles, has “natural consequences … which are danger to life,” or “a high 
probability [of] result[ing] in death.”145 
The court also included, such “evidence, coupled with the defendant’s four previous 
convictions for driving under the influence, [was] not only sufficient but overwhelmingly 
uph[eld] the finding of implied malice.”146 The court articulated that the defendant’s argument 
that there is no substantial evidence his actions could result in death … “is nonsense, if not an 
affront to this court.”147 Here, of course, the court said “that defendant’s four previous 
convictions for drunken driving, and his repeated exposure to a drinking drivers’ education 
program” provide additional elements not present in Watson.148 Moreover, “nowhere does the 
opinion in Watson state that all of the factors present in that case are necessary to a finding of 
second degree murder … Watson … deliberately [declined] to prescribe a formula for analysis of 
vehicular homicide cases, instead requiring a case-by-case approach.”149 
7. People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734
The court considered evidence of defendant’s reckless driving up to 24 miles away from 
the point of collision where defendant drove the opposite way on the freeway crashing into a 
vehicle and killing its occupants.150 In this case, the defendant killed four people in a head-on 
collision and injured two others while driving drunk with a blood alcohol level between .18 and 
.23 percent as he drove eastbound on the westbound side of the freeway at speeds of 55-80 miles 
per hour.151 Traveling against traffic, primarily in the emergency lane net to the center divider 
and the number one (fast) lane, he drove about four miles.152 He first struck the side of one car, 
and caused another to swerve out of control; two persons were injured when he did so.153 The 
defendant then struck head-on another car, killing all four persons inside.154 
Evidence established the defendant had earlier been convicted of driving under the 
influence and ordered to attend traffic school.155 Shortly thereafter, he was arrested, again 
convicted of driving under the influence, placed on probation, an ordered to attend an approved 
 
145 People v. McCarnes (1986) Cal.App.3d 525, 533. 
146 People v. McCarnes (1986) Cal.App.3d 525, 533 [emphasis added]. 
147 People v. McCarnes (1986) Cal.App.3d 525, 533. 
148 People v. McCarnes (1986) Cal.App.3d 525, 534. 
149 People v. McCarnes (1986) Cal.App.3d 525, 535. 
150 People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 741, n.2. 
151 People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 737. 
152 People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 737. 
153 People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 737. 
154 People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 737. 
155 People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 737. 
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drinking program.156 Notwithstanding these convictions and attendance at the drinking program, 
he had three beers at lunch, 10-12 beers at an after-work party, and another 5-8 on the day and 
evening of the fatal collision.157 
In rejecting the defendant’s argument that insufficient evidence supported an implied 
malice finding, the Court of Appeal observed he had deliberately chose on the day of the fatal 
collision to drive his truck to work so he could attend the drinking party after work.158 Further, 
the defendant thereafter deliberately chose to drink and drive – knowing that after the party he 
would have to drive a long distance home.159 Here, the court mentioned that the pattern of 
defendant’s driving, that he was going the wrong way on the freeway, indicates that he had to be 
aware of the danger posed to human lives, and knowing this, he deliberately proceeded in 
conscious disregard of that risk.160 
8. People v. Olivas (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 984
In People v. Olivas, the police, at high speeds, pursued the defendant while he was 
driving a brand new car stolen earlier that day from an automobile dealership.161 Two police 
cars were involved in the chase, reaching speeds between 50-100 miles per hour on city streets 
with speed limits of 25-30 miles per hour; during the chase, the defendant ran four stop signs and 
three red lights.  After narrowly avoiding a collision with other cars when he ran the first light, 
he ran a stop sign while traveling 57 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone and struck a 
vehicle broadside – killing a nine month old child inside and causing the driver who was two 
months pregnant to miscarry.162 A blood sample taken from the defendant “was found to contain 
.02 percent blood alcohol and .04 parts per million of PCP.” 163 
In finding there was sufficient evidence of implied malice, the Court of Appeal noted the 
defendant had consumed enough PCP to impair his physical and mental facilities, and then drove 
at extremely high speed through city streets for a relatively lengthy period of time, creating a 
great risk to other drivers.164 The fact he was aware of this risk, was shown by his collision with 
one car, his near collision with two other cars, and his deliberate avoidance of two pursuing 
 
156 People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 737. 
157 People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 740. 
158 People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 746. 
159 People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 746. 
160 People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 747. 
161 People v. Olivas (1985) Cal.App.3d 984, 986. 
162 People v. Olivas (1985) Cal.App.3d 984, 986. 
163 People v. Olivas (1985) Cal.App.3d 984, 986. 
164 People v. Olivas (1985) Cal.App.3d 984, 989. 
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police cars.165 Although he was further appraised of the risk when he nearly collided with two 
more cars while running the first red light, he nonetheless “chose to continue his extremely 
dangerous driving even after the danger to the lives of others was demonstrated.”166 And, the 
court expressly held, “[t]he criminal act underlying vehicular murder is not use of intoxicating 
substances in anticipation of driving, but is driving under the influence with conscious disregard 
for life.”167 
9. People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104
In People v. Ortiz, the court discussed the admissibly of evidence of a defendant’s prior 
conduct in a vehicular murder case to show his subjective awareness of the risk he created.168 In 
that case a jury found the defendant guilty to second degree murder, arising from his 
involvement in a head-on vehicular collision in which two of four family members, visiting 
California from New Zealand, died.169 
The defendant had likely been driving at least 80 miles per hour,170 tried to overtake a 
vehicle traveling in front of him by crossing a double yellow line on a state highway.171 
Unfortunately, the defendant found himself driving directly in the path of an oncoming vehicle 
on the other side of the highway.  Defendant’s truck collided with the oncoming car and the two 
occupants were killed.172 Earlier on in the morning of the collision, defendant had driving his car 
recklessly, traveling at high speeds, tailgating cars and passing them over double yellow lines on 
a curve.173 
The parties stipulated, prior to trial, that the defendant was not under the influence of any 
intoxicant at the time of the accident.174 At trial, over defense objection the trial court admitted 
evidence consisting of documentary and oral testimony concerning seven past incidents in which 
the defendant had either been convicted of reckless driving, convicted of reckless drunk driving, 
or been observed driving recklessly, and his participation in mandatory educational program 
(known as the SB-38 program) on the dangers of drinking and driving.175 
165 People v. Olivas (1985) Cal.App.3d 984, 989. 
166 People v. Olivas (1985) Cal.App.3d 984, 989. 
167 People v. Olivas (1985) Cal.App.3d 984, 988-989. 
168 People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 108-109. 
169 People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 106. 
170 California Highway Patrol officers determined defendant’s truck was mechanically sound at the time of collision 
and capable of reaching speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour.  People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 106-
107. 
171 People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 107. 
172 People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 106. 
173 People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 107-109. 
174 People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 111. 
175 People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 110. 
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In ruling that the evidence of the defendant’s prior conduct was admissible, the trial court 
states its rationale: 
‘Every time the defendant drove badly before he allegedly committed these two 
murders,’ the trial judge explained, ‘and every time he was convicted or arrested or 
punished in some fashion, his awareness of the dangers of driving badly increased and 
that is what the district attorney has a legitimate right to try to prove . . . [did] this 
defendant have implied malice in his mind or not when he drove the way he did, and that 
is a subjective standard.  So we have to find out what he was exposed to that most people 
aren’t exposed to in order to understand his level of awareness of the dangers of driving 
badly.176 
The Court of Appeal affirmed.  The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting 
evidence of the defendant’s past conduct, including the alcohol-related conduct, as relevant to 
the determination whether the defendant had the wanton disregard for human life requisite to 
establish a finding of implied malice.177 The court further held the trial court properly ruled this 
evidence admissible as more probative than prejudicial.178 Finally, the court held that any error 
was not prejudicial, given the admissible evidence of the egregiousness of defendant’s reckless 
driving at the time of the accident. 
10. People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983
In People v. Sanchez, the defendant was the driver of a Ford Bronco that killed a man.179 
Defendant was charged with both murder and gross vehicular manslaughter.180 
In statements to the police and at trial, he gave conflicting accounts of the circumstances 
of the collision and of his own alcohol consumption preceding the collision.181 He admitted 
some alcohol consumption,182 but denied feeling intoxicated.  “Because of various indications 
that he was under the influence of alcohol, defendant was arrested at the scene, and en route to 
the police station he commented laughingly that he was scheduled to appear on another driving-
under-the-influence charge that morning.” 183 He also commented that his wife had told him not 
to drink and drive.184 
176 People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 115-116. 
177 People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 111. 
178 Cal. Evidence Code Section 352. 
179 People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 985. 
180 In addition to the charges of murder and gross vehicular manslaughter he was also charged with driving under the 
influence of alcohol causing injury to another; driving with a blood alcohol level in excess of .08 percent with injury 
to another; hit and run causing injury; and perjury.   
181 People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 986-987. 
182 People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 987.  His blood-alcohol level two hours after the collision was .17 
percent. 
183 People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 987. 
184 People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 987. 
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In addition, the defendant had sustained two prior convictions for driving under the 
influence of alcohol, and one additional such charge was pending against him.185 He was 
ordered to attend a drinking driver’s educational program, but failed to do so.186 Finally, the 
defendant had been driving without a valid driver’s license since 1988, when his license was 
suspended in connection with his first conviction.187 
Here, the California Supreme Court held that gross vehicular manslaughter while 
intoxicated is not a lesser included offense of murder, and thus defendant could be convicted of 
both offenses.188 Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated requires proof of elements that 
need not be proved when the charge is murder, that is, use of a vehicle and intoxication.189 
11. People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290
In People v. Watson, the California Supreme Court specifically addressed the 
applicability of an implied malice second degree murder theory to a vehicular manslaughter 
homicide.  In this case, the defendant consumed large quantities of beer and then drove through a 
red light, narrowly avoiding a collision.190 He then drove away at high speed reaching 84 miles 
per hour and, despite applying his brakes, struck a car at another intersection; where he struck a 
Toyota sedan and three passengers were ejected from the vehicle and the driver and her six-year-
old daughter were killed.191 There were 112 feet of skid marks prior to impact and another 180 
feet thereafter.192 The defendant’s sped was estimated by experts at 70 miles per hour at the 
point of impact.193 His blood-alcohol level one-half hour after the collision was .23 percent.194 
The defendant was charged with two counts of second degree murder and two counts of 
vehicular manslaughter, but the trial court granted his motion to dismiss the murder counts.  
Held, order of dismissal reversed. 
 The California Supreme Court in Watson held:  (a) The general murder statutes, P.C. 187 
et seq., are not preempted by the more specific vehicular manslaughter statute195; and (b) The 
defendant’s conduct was sufficiently wanton to support a second degree murder charge.  He 
drove his car to an establishment where he consumed a large quantity of beer.  He then drove at 
 
185 People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 987. 
186 People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 987. 
187 People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 987. 
188 People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 985. 
189 People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 985. 
190 People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 293. 
191 People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 293. 
192 People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 293. 
193 People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 294. 
194 People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 294. 
195 Watson at p. 297. 
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an excessive speed through city streets, presenting a great risk of harm.196 After narrowly 
missing one vehicle, he resumed an excessive speed and then attempted to brake his car before 
impact, suggesting an actual awareness of the great risk of harm he had created.197 
The court noted that the evidence adduced at the preliminary examination was not 
necessarily sufficient to convict the defendant of second degree murder and that the prosecution 
must still establish implied malice beyond a reasonable doubt.  “Moreover, we neither 
contemplate nor encourage the routine charging of second degree murder in vehicular homicide 
cases.  We merely determine that the evidence before us is sufficient to uphold the second degree 
murder counts in the information.”198 
12. People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229
In People v. Whitson, the defendant was guilty of two counts of second degree murder, 
arising from two deaths that occurred when defendant, while driving a VW, ran through a red 
light at a speed estimated to be 77 miles per hour and collided with another car.199 Here, the 
defendant was being chased by an officer on a motorcycle and when the officer activated his 
emergency lights and siren the VW sped up to 80-85 miles per hour.200 The officer saw the VW 
turn off his headlights, maneuver around two vehicles and then the officer lost track of the 
VW.201 Immediately thereafter, the officer observed a scene of a “major injury accident” crash 
between the VW and an Acura sedan.202 Both the driver and the passenger of the Acura sedan 
bled to death.203 
There was no evidence the defendant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the 
time of the collision and the defendant possessed a California driver’s license at the time of the 
collision.204 At the time of trial, evidence was introduced pertaining to the defendant’s driving 
record;205 establishing that defendant had attended traffic school, was involved in a traffic 
accident four years prior (for which police determined he was at fault for failing to yield the right 
of way), received a citation for driving at an excessive speed and was cited for failing to obey a 
posted sign two years before.206 The prosecution “introduced the evidence relating to 
 
196 Watson at p. 301. 
197 Watson at p. 300. 
198 Watson at p. 301. 
199 People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 233. 
200 People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 234. 
201 People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 234. 
202 People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 234. 
203 People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 235. 
204 People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 239. 
205 People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 235. 
206 People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 235. 
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defendant’s poor driving record and attendance at traffic school in order to support its claim that, 
at the time of the collision, defendant subjectively was aware of the serious risk of death posed 
by his reckless driving.” 207 The Court found that “even without the evidence of defendant’s 
poor driving record … there was strong evidence establishing that defendant was aware of the 
serious risks from his dangerous driving--including, most significantly, his explicit admission, in 
one of his pretrial statements to the police, that he realized that his driving on the night in 
question was dangerous and that while driving he was ‘afraid I’m going to kill someone or hurt 
someone else.’” 208 
The Court reasoned that “In addition to the foregoing express admission by defendant of 
his awareness of the danger to life posed by his driving, the evidence before the jury concerning 
the circumstances leading up to the collision strongly supports a finding of such awareness.” 209 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
While there is certainly no hard and fast rule for determining whether a vehicle killing is 
a crime of murder or manslaughter, but there are common factors that continually emerge from 
the Court’s analyses of what constitutes a sufficient degree of factors among to affirm a 
conviction of second degree murder.  The common factors to consider they are: 
 
11) Illegal Driving Maneuvers:  Running red lights & stop signs 
12) Speeding 
13) Not Necessarily Illegal Driving Maneuvers:  Swerving & Passing 
14) “Almost” collisions on the day of the killing 
15) Alcohol consumption 
16) Drug use 
17) Traffic Citations 
18) Driving Under the Influence (DUI) conviction(s) 
19) Mandatory classes taken related to drinking and driving 
20) Forewarning before incident cautioning about dangerous driving 
 
207 People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 251. 
208 People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 251. 
209 People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 251. 
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To withstand a possibility of reversal, a prosecutor should objectively evaluate the facts 
of his or her particular case and pinpoint these commonalities, presenting them to the trial judge 
with the aforementioned case law to back up their factual analysis.  With these stepping-stones in 
mind, the road to proper filing need not be so harrowing, and, with the proper facts and 
presentation, a proper charge will be the result.  
 
